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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge: 
 
This case raises the question whether and in what 
circumstances a corporation and its officers have an 
obligation to investors to update, or at least not to repeat, 
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particular projections regarding the corporation'sfinancial 
situation. Plaintiffs in this securities-fraud action are 
purchasers of stock in The Quaker Oats Company 
("Quaker") who contend that defendants, Quaker and its 
chief executive officer, William D. Smithburg, disseminated 
false or misleading information to the investment 
community. Plaintiffs assert that defendants violated 
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, and the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 
10b-5, by continuing to announce or let stand certain 
projected figures for earnings growth and debt-to-equity 
ratio which defendants allegedly knew had become 
inaccurate in light of Quaker's planned, highly leveraged, 
acquisition of Snapple Beverage Corp. ("Snapple"). 
 
The district court, on motion by defendants, dismissed 
the case for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). For the reasons given below, the judgment of the 
district court will be reversed. 
 
I. 
 
In reviewing a judgment dismissing a complaint for 
failure to state a claim, all well-pleaded allegations are 
taken to be true. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 
(3d Cir. 1993). The following recitation of the facts of this 
case is therefore drawn from the "Second Amended Class 
Action Complaint."1 
 
This action was brought "on behalf of a class of persons 
who purchased the common stock of Quaker during the 
period from August 4, 1994 through and including 
November 1, 1994." Complaint at P 4. Plaintiffs Myron 
Weiner, Nicholas Sitnycky, Ronald Anderson and Robert 
Furman all purchased Quaker stock during the proposed 
class period. 
 
Defendant Quaker is a New Jersey corporation which 
produces and markets a variety of consumer food products 
and beverages, including Gatorade soft drink. Defendant 
William D. Smithburg is Quaker's chairman and chief 
executive. The complaint asserts that, in 1994, Quaker was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The class has not yet been certified. 
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widely considered vulnerable to takeover. Allegedly in order 
to make Quaker a less attractive candidate for takeover and 
thereby to protect their own positions, Quaker's 
management resolved to increase the company's debt by 
acquiring Snapple, a manufacturer of bottled juices and 
flavored tea products. On November 2, 1994, the two 
companies announced that they would combine in a $1.7 
billion tender offer and merger transaction. The deal was 
financed entirely with new debt, significantly increasing 
Quaker's debt-load and making the company a far less 
appealing takeover prospect.2 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Negotiations between Quaker and Snapple apparently 
began in the spring of 1994. As Smithburg later told 
Bloomberg Business News, "[R]ight after some discussions 
started, it was so obvious that [Snapple] had an interest 
and we had an interest and these two great brands, 
Gatorade and Snapple, [would] benefit from a put-together, 
and it just snowballed from then...." Complaint at P 29. By 
early August 1994, Quaker had advised Snapple that it was 
interested in pursuing a merger of the two companies and 
had commenced a due diligence investigation. Id. The deal 
was consummated in November of that year. 
 
Over the course of the year prior to its acquisition of 
Snapple, Quaker had announced in several public 
documents and public statements the company's 
expectations for earnings growth and its guideline for debt- 
to-equity ratio. It is these announcements, and the 
numbers contained therein, which form the basis for the 
instant action. 
 
On October 4, 1993, in its Annual Report for the fiscal 
year ended June 30, 1993, Quaker included the following 
statement: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. According to press reports, two years after the acquisition Quaker 
undertook to sell Snapple -- for some $1.4 billion less than the 
acquisition price. See Barnaby J. Feder, Quaker to Sell Snapple for $300 
Million, N.Y.Times, March 28, 1997, at D1, D16 ("Closing the books on 
what some analysts have called the worst acquisition in recent memory" 
and "touch[ing] off another round in the almost incessant takeover 
speculation that has surrounded Quaker in recent years"). 
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       One way to measure debt is to compute the ratio of 
       [total] debt as a percent of total debt plus preferred and 
       common shareholders' equity. Total debt includes both 
       short-term and long-term borrowing. Our debt-to-total 
       capitalization ratio at June 30, 1993 was 59 percent, 
       up from 49 percent in fiscal 1992. Quaker's total debt 
       remained essentially even. Therefore, this increase was 
       primarily due to the decrease in the book value of 
       common shareholders' equity which resulted from our 
       share repurchases and the $116 million charge for 
       adopting new accounting principles. For the future, our 
       guideline will be in the upper-60 percent range. 
 
Complaint at P22. 
 
Smithburg reiterated this "guideline" in a letter contained 
in the same Annual Report: 
 
       [O]ur Board of Directors [has] authorized an increase in 
       our leverage guideline, along with a share repurchase 
       program of up to 5 million shares. Our guideline for 
       leverage in the future will be to maintain a total debt- 
       to-total capitalization ratio in the upper-60 percent 
       range. 
 
Complaint at P 23. 
 
Quaker's Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 
1993, which was filed with the SEC in November 1993, 
repeated the total debt-to-total capitalization ratio 
guideline: 
 
       Short-term and long-term debt (total debt) as of 
       September 30, 1993, increased $98.6 million from 
       June 30, 1993. The total-debt-to-total capitalization 
       ratio . . . was 63.5 percent and 59.0 percent as of 
       September 30, 1993 and June 30, 1993, respectively. 
       . . . One of the Company's financial objectives is to 
       generate economic value through the use of leverage, 
       while maintaining a solid financial position through 
       strong operating cash flows. The Company has decided 
       to increase its guideline for leverage in the future to the 
       upper-60 percent range. 
 
Complaint at P 24. 
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Quaker did not, at any time before the November 1994 
announcement of the acquisition of Snapple, make any 
public statement or public filing that amended or qualified 
the above quoted recitals from the 1993 Annual Report and 
the Form 10-Q. 
 
On August 4, 1994, Quaker announced its financial 
results for the fourth quarter and the fiscal year that had 
ended June 30, 1994. In a published report and a public 
meeting, Quaker announced a growth in earnings of 5% 
over earnings for fiscal 1993. The Dow Jones News Wire 
reported that at the August 4 meeting Smithburg had 
stated Quaker was " `confident' of achieving at least 7% real 
earnings growth" in fiscal 1995. Complaint at P 27. 
 
On September 23, 1994, Quaker disseminated its Annual 
Report for fiscal 1994. The report, which was incorporated 
into Quaker's Form 10-K filed the same day with the SEC, 
stated that "we are committed to achieving a real earnings 
growth of at least 7 percent over time." Complaint at P 33. 
 
The 1994 Annual Report also contained a statement 
regarding the company's total debt-to-total capitalization 
ratio. Quaker noted that 
 
       [a]t the end of fiscal 1994, our total debt-to-total 
       capitalization ratio was 68.8 percent on a book-value 
       basis, in line with our guideline in the upper-60 
       percent range. 
 
Complaint at P 32. 
 
On November 2, 1994, Quaker and Snapple announced 
that Quaker would acquire Snapple in a tender offer and 
merger transaction for $1.7 billion in cash. Subsequent to 
this announcement, the price of Quaker stock fell $7.375 
per share -- approximately 10% of the stock's value. 
Complaint at P 34. 
 
To finance the acquisition, Quaker had obtained a $2.4 
billion credit from a banking group led by NationsBank 
Corp. The Snapple acquisition nearly tripled Quaker's debt, 
from approximately $1 billion to approximately $2.7 billion. 
The acquisition also increased Quaker's total debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio to approximately 80%. Complaint at 
P 35. 
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Securities analysts suggested that the merger would 
make Quaker less attractive as a takeover target. One noted 
that "[Quaker's] takeover potential seems quite low," 
another that "[i]t was a do-or-die deal. Quaker had to buy 
something or they were going to be taken out." A third 
asserted that "[i]t is clearly a defensive move. They're paying 
a fair amount for Snapple. Suddenly someone can't swoop 
in and buy up Quaker. Even a leveraged buyout investor 
can't break things up because of a huge gorilla like 
Snapple." Complaint at P 35. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
On November 10, 1994, purchasers of Quaker stock in 
the period before the Snapple acquisition filed two actions, 
which were later consolidated, in federal court in New 
Jersey. In each action, plaintiff stock purchasers alleged 
that defendants Quaker and Smithburg had violated 
sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,3 15 U.S.C. SS 78j(b) and 78t, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's Rule 10b-5,4 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b- 
5. Plaintiffs maintained that defendants had known that 
the impending purchase of Snapple would drive Quaker's 
total debt-to-total capitalization ratio up and earnings 
growth down, but had nonetheless failed to adjust their 
public projections for those figures. This failure, plaintiffs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 10(b) prohibits the "use or employ[ment], in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security, . . . [of] any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). 
Section 20(a) provides liability for "controlling persons" in a 
corporation. 
15 U.S.C. S 78t(a). 
 
4. Rule 10b-5 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
        It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the 
       use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
       the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, . 
. . 
 
        . . . . 
 
        (b) To make any untrue statement of a material  fact or to omit to 
       state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
       made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
       made, not misleading . . . , in connection with the purchase or 
sale 
       of any security. 
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claimed, had artificially inflated the price of Quaker's stock 
in the period from August 4 to November 1, 1994. Keeping 
the stock price up during this period, plaintiffs alleged, had 
kept Quaker from itself being taken over. When the deal 
with Snapple was revealed, and the price of Quaker stock 
fell to reflect what plaintiffs maintain was the true value of 
a company that had just taken on an additional $1.7 billion 
in debt, investors who had believed defendants' 
representations as to growth and total debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio projections experienced a 10% loss in 
the worth of their stock. 
 
On July 27, 1995, defendants moved, under Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b), to dismiss 
plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint. 
Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition, and Quaker 
and Smithburg responded with a reply brief and a 
document entitled "Supplemental Affidavit of Dennis J. 
Block." Plaintiffs moved to strike certain documents 
appended to the Supplemental Affidavit on the ground that 
plaintiffs had neither quoted nor relied upon the documents 
in the complaint. On May 23, 1996, the district court 
denied the motion to strike and dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim.5 In so ruling, the court found 
immaterial as a matter of law Quaker's statements 
concerning the company's "guideline" for the ratio of total 
debt-to-total capitalization that it would maintain in 1995 
and the projection of 7% earnings growth in 1995. It 
further found that the latter figure was per se reasonable 
because Quaker's average annual earnings growth over the 
previous five years had exceeded 7%. The court therefore 
decided that there had been no violation of S 10(b) or Rule 
10b-5 and that, because a S 20(a) claim could not be 
sustained absent a finding of liability underS 10(b), the 
S 20(a) claim would also be dismissed. This appeal followed. 
 
On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's 
determination that Quaker's statements concerning the 
company's total debt-to-total capitalization guideline were 
immaterial, and that Quaker's projections of earnings 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because it dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6), the court found 
moot defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b). 
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growth were (a) per se reasonable and (b) per se immaterial. 
In addition, plaintiffs contest the district court's ruling that 
Quaker's Schedules 14D-1 and 14D-9, documents filed 
with the SEC soon after the acquisition of Snapple, could 
be considered on a motion to dismiss.6  Defendants in turn 
press the argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b) offers an alternative ground upon which to affirm the 
district court's dismissal of the complaint. 
 
C. Jurisdiction 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
SS 78aa and 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
In examining the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6), we exercise plenary review. Lorenz, 1 F.3d 
at 1411. In so doing, we must accept the allegations of the 
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs. Id. We may affirm only if 
it appears certain that plaintiffs could prove no set of facts 
supporting their claim which would entitle them to relief. 
See Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
 
II. 
 
The Supreme Court has had frequent occasion to observe 
that "the fundamental purpose of the [Securities Exchange] 
Act [was] `to substitute a policy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor . . . .' " Santa Fe Industries, Inc. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (quoting Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972), in turn 
quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 
180, 186 (1963)); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 230 (1988). Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to 
S 10(b) of the Act, provides the framework for a private 
cause of action for violations involving false statements or 
omissions of material fact. See Basic, at 230-31. To 
establish a valid claim of securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. There is no indication in plaintiffs' briefs that they seek to appeal 
from 
the district court's dismissal of the S 20(a) "controlling person" claim 
against Smithburg. 
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plaintiffs "must prove that the defendant[s] (1) made 
misstatements or omissions of material fact; (2) with 
scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities; (4) upon which plaintiffs relied; and (5) that 
plaintiffs' reliance was the proximate cause of their injury." 
Kline v. First Western Government Securities, Inc., 24 F.3d 
480, 487 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1032 (1994); see 
also In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, 881 F.2d 
1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
In the present litigation, the plaintiffs allege that during 
the proposed class period they purchased shares in reliance 
on statements made by Quaker and Smithburg about (1) 
Quaker's guideline for the ratio of total debt-to-total 
capitalization (in the upper 60 percent range) governing the 
company's financial planning and (2) Quaker's expected 
earnings growth in fiscal 1995. 
 
The statements about expected earnings growth were 
made in August and September of 1994 -- at the 
commencement of, and mid-way through, the proposed 
class period -- and it is plaintiffs' contention that, at a 
point when Quaker was in active pursuit of Snapple, 
Quaker and Smithburg must have known that the 
projections were illusory. 
 
The statements about the guideline for the ratio of total 
debt-to-total capitalization were made either prior to the 
proposed class period or during the class period as a 
description of completed events. Plaintiffs' central complaint 
with respect to these statements is that, when the Snapple 
negotiations went into high gear, Quaker and Smithburg 
had to have known that a total debt-to-total capitalization 
ratio in the high 60 percent range was no longer a realistic 
possibility. At that point, plaintiffs contend, defendants had 
a duty publicly to set the guidelines record straight. 
 
We will first consider the statements regarding Quaker's 
guideline for the ratio of total debt-to-total capitalization. 
Then we will turn to the statements about expected growth 
in earnings. 
 
A. The Total Debt-to-Total Capitalization Ratio Guideline 
 
Plaintiffs' claims under this heading are claims of 
nondisclosure. "When an allegation of fraud under section 
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10(b) is based upon a nondisclosure, there can be no fraud 
absent a duty to speak." Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1418. In general, 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not impose a duty on 
defendants to correct prior statements -- particularly 
statements of intent -- so long as those statements were 
true when made. See In re Phillips Petroleum, 881 F.2d at 
1245. However, "[t]here can be no doubt that a duty exists 
to correct prior statements, if the prior statements were 
true when made but misleading if left unrevised." Id. To 
avoid liability in such circumstances, "notice of a change of 
intent [must] be disseminated in a timely fashion." Id. at 
1246. Whether an amendment is sufficiently prompt is a 
question that "must be determined in each case based 
upon the particular facts and circumstances." Id. 
 
In the present case, plaintiffs allege that defendants' 
statements in the months leading up to the merger with 
Snapple improperly omitted mention of a planned increase 
in the total debt-to-total capitalization ratio guideline. The 
district court, discounting the allegation, found that "[n]o 
reasonable investor could interpret the Leverage[total debt- 
to-total capitalization] Ratio Guideline as an absolute 
restriction on Quaker's ability to take advantage of a 
corporate opportunity which might cause Quaker to exceed 
the Leverage [total debt-to-total capitalization] Ratio 
Guideline." 928 F. Supp. at 1386. On this appeal, in urging 
the correctness of the district court's determination, 
defendants contend that plaintiffs are unable to establish 
the first element of a claim under S10(b) and Rule 10b-5: 
the materiality of defendants' repetition of Quaker's "upper 
60-percent range" total debt-to-total capitalization ratio 
guideline after the merger with Snapple became a 
probability. 
 
1. Materiality 
 
The Supreme Court set forth the standard for materiality 
of an omitted statement under S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in 
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Plaintiffs in 
Basic had been stockholders in Basic Incorporated, a 
company whose directors, in December of 1978, approved 
a friendly tender offer from Combustion Engineers to 
acquire Basic's common stock. The December 1978 
announcement was the culmination of over two years of 
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negotiations between Basic and Combustion -- a period 
during which Basic on three occasions publicly denied that 
merger discussions or other developments likely to have 
significant effect on share values were pending. Plaintiffs 
sold their holdings in Basic subsequent to the first of 
Basic's public denials. After the merger, plaintiffs sued 
Basic and those who had been Basic directors during the 
two years leading up to the merger. Plaintiffs alleged that 
Basic's public denials were material misrepresentations 
which had, to plaintiffs' detriment, weakened the market in 
Basic's stock. 
 
In Basic, the Court adopted in the context of S 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 the standard of materiality set forth in TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), a 
case arising under S 14(a) of the 1934 Act. See Basic, 485 
U.S. at 232. The Basic Court approved, for cases involving 
undisclosed merger plans, the principle that "[a]n omitted 
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in 
deciding how to [proceed]." Id. at 231 (quoting TSC 
Industries, 426 U.S. at 449). Under this standard, there 
must be "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the `total mix' of 
information made available." Id. 
 
In Basic, the Court rejected a proposed bright-line test 
that "preliminary merger discussions do not become 
material until `agreement-in-principle' as to the price and 
structure of the transaction has been reached between the 
would-be merger partners." Basic, 485 U.S. at 233. In its 
place, the Court called for a fact-specific inquiry: "Whether 
merger discussions in any particular case are material . . . 
depends on the facts. . . . No particular event or factor 
short of closing the transaction need be either necessary or 
sufficient by itself to render merger discussions material." 
Id. at 239. 
 
Subsequent to Basic, this court has had occasion to 
address with greater particularity the standard of 
materiality to be applied, in a securities-fraud action, to a 
motion to dismiss: "[M]ateriality is a mixed question of law 
and fact, and the delicate assessments of the inferences a 
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reasonable shareholder would draw from a given set of facts 
are peculiarly for the trier of fact." Shapiro v. UJB Financial 
Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 281 n.11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 934 (1992). Therefore, "[o]nly if the alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions are so obviously 
unimportant to an investor that reasonable minds cannot 
differ on the question of materiality is it appropriate for the 
district court to rule that the allegations are inactionable as 
a matter of law." Id. 
 
Applying the standard set forth in Shapiro to the pending 
case, we note first that the emphasis on a fact-specific 
determination of materiality militates against a dismissal on 
the pleadings. The complaint identifies three separate 
documents in which Quaker described its total debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio policy: the 1993 Annual Report issued 
October 4, 1993 ("Our guideline for leverage in the future 
will be to maintain a total debt-to-total capitalization ratio 
in the upper-60 percent range"), Complaint at P22; the 
Form 10-Q filed in November 1993 ("The Company has 
decided to increase its guideline for leverage in the future to 
the upper-60 percent range"), Complaint at P 24; and the 
1994 Annual Report issued September 23, 1994 ("At the 
end of fiscal 1994, our total debt-to-total capitalization ratio 
was 68.8 percent on a book-value basis, in line with our 
guideline in the upper-60 percent range"), Complaint at 
P 32. None of these statements was actually incorrect at the 
time of its publication. Even the last, which plaintiffs assert 
was "false when made," in isolation appears a 
straightforward statement of fact; there is no indication 
that as of the end of fiscal 1994 Quaker's total debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio was anything but 68.8%. 
 
But, of course, the statements were not made in 
isolation. Rather, by including the total debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio guideline in the 1993 Annual Report -- 
indeed, by setting it forth in at least three separate places 
in that document -- Quaker may well have created the 
reasonable understanding among investors that the ratio 
guideline was a number to which Quaker attached 
considerable significance. And any such understanding 
could well have been reinforced by the iteration of the ratio 
guideline in the November 1993 Form 10-Q and the 1994 
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Annual Report published on September 23, 1994. Taken 
together, the statements could indeed have induced a 
reasonable investor to expect either that the ratio guideline 
would remain in "the upper-60 percent range," or that 
Quaker would announce any anticipated significant 
change. That is, it would have been entirely reasonable for 
an investor to assume that if defendants believed, as of 
September 23, 1994, that Quaker's total debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio would soon change significantly, the 
company would have said so in its Annual Report forfiscal 
1994 issued on that date. As noted earlier, Smithburg had 
stated in a letter contained in Quaker's 1993 Annual 
Report that "[o]ur guideline for leverage in the future will be 
to maintain a total debt-to-total capitalization ratio in the 
upper-60 percent range" (emphasis added); there is no 
evident reason to confine the phrase "in the future" to the 
single year after the initial announcement. 
 
In sum, in the present case, we find that a trier of fact 
could conclude that a reasonable investor reading the 1993 
Annual Report published on October 4, 1993, and then the 
1994 Annual Report published on September 23, 1994, 
would have no ground for anticipating that the total debt- 
to-total capitalization ratio would rise as significantly as it 
did in fiscal 1995. There was after all no abjuration of the 
"upper 60-percent range" guideline. The company had 
predicted the rise from 59 percent to the "upper 60-percent 
range" in the 1993 report and that rise had occurred by 
and was confirmed in the 1994 report. Therefore, it was 
reasonable for an investor to expect that the company 
would make another such prediction if it expected the ratio 
to change markedly in the ensuing year. 
 
The district court held that "[t]o require Quaker to 
disclose the possibility it might seek loans to finance an 
acquisition is tantamount to requiring the disclosure of the 
acquisition negotiations." 928 F. Supp. at 1383. But 
plaintiffs do not argue that Quaker should have stated that 
the guideline would be adjusted "to finance an acquisition." 
The more relevant question is whether Quaker could have 
communicated a projected increase in the level of the total 
debt-to-total capitalization ratio guideline without alerting 
investors to the impending merger with Snapple. There is 
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reason to believe Quaker had the ability to do just that. The 
company had announced plans to increase the ratio 
substantially in its 1993 Annual Report for a variety of 
reasons unrelated to acquiring other companies. Quaker 
then observed in its 1994 Annual Report, in a paragraph 
discussing the ratio guideline, that among other things 
"increased debt" had allowed the company to "acquire four 
businesses." Defendants do not argue that the 1993 
announcement alerted investors to Quaker's potential 
acquisition of these four businesses. Thus, Quaker's own 
actions strongly suggest that a change in a ratio guideline 
can be projected without explicitly or implicitly alerting the 
investment community. 
 
Furthermore, even if an announced change in the ratio 
guideline would have alerted the reasonably savvy investor 
to an imminent acquisition, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that it is not the role of the courts to interfere with the 
policy of disclosure "chosen and recognized" in the 
securities laws. Basic, 485 U.S. at 234. "We think that 
creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a 
prodisclosure legislative philosophy, because complying 
with the regulation might be `bad for business,' is a role for 
Congress, not this Court." Id. at 240 n.17. 
 
We recognize that it is quite likely that Quaker and 
Snapple had not yet agreed on the precise terms of their 
merger by the beginning of August 1994, or indeed even 
until shortly before the deal was announced on November 
2 of that year. But plaintiffs do not allege that the terms of 
the agreement were set by the opening of the proposed 
class period in early August. Instead, they urge that, 
whatever the terms of the agreement may have been by the 
time of the purported false or misleading statements, it 
must by then have been clear to defendants that the merger 
would compel Quaker to take on sufficient additional debt 
to raise the total debt-to-total capitalization ratio to a level 
far higher than the "upper-60 percent" range. 7 We think 
that a fact-finder could so find. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Therefore, it makes no difference to the outcome of this appeal 
whether the district court erred in considering Quaker's Schedule 14D-1 
and Schedule 14D-9, which were apparently filed two days after the 
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We hold, therefore, that defendants have failed to 
establish that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support 
of their claim which would entitle them to relief. The 
complaint alleges facts on the basis of which a reasonable 
factfinder could determine that Quaker's statements 
regarding its total debt-to-total capitalization ratio guideline 
would have been material to a reasonable investor, and 
hence that Quaker had a duty to update such statements 
when they became unreliable.8 
 
2. Rule 9(b) 
 Defendants offer as an alternative basis for affirmance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
announcement of the merger. These documents, defendants argue, 
include statements that "through September and October 1994" Quaker 
and Snapple continued to discuss "alternative structures for the 
transaction," including one scenario "that would have provided for 
partial payment in Quaker stock." We note that defendants do not argue 
that this alternative structure would have made the deal one paid for 
entirely by stock -- or even primarily by stock. That is, defendants do 
not 
argue that at any time during the proposed class period Quaker believed 
that the amount of debt that it would have to assume as a result of the 
merger would be so small as to have no significant impact on the 
company's total debt-to-total capitalization ratio. Accordingly, 
consideration vel non of the Schedule 14D-1 and Schedule 14D-9 does 
not affect the outcome of this appeal, and we need not answer the 
question whether the district court properly addressed the documents in 
deciding the motion to dismiss. 
 
8. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs failed adequately to plead 
scienter, a necessary element of any 10b-5 action. Scienter "need not be 
[pleaded] with `great specificity.' " In re Time Warner Securities 
Litigation, 
9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 
1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994). It may be 
adequately alleged by setting forth facts establishing a motive and an 
opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting forth facts that constitute 
circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior. See id. 
at 269. The complaint alleges that Quaker's management took advantage 
of specific opportunities to communicate with the investment community 
in order to inflate the price of Quaker stock, fend off a widely-rumored 
potential takeover, and preserve management's own jobs. Because the 
complaint therefore sets forth facts establishing both motive and 
opportunity to commit fraud, we hold that plaintiffs have adequately 
alleged scienter. 
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the complaint's alleged lack of compliance with the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).9 That 
rule dictates that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or malice shall be 
stated with particularity." Our cases warn, however, that 
"focusing exclusively on the particularity requirement is too 
narrow an approach and fails to take account of the general 
simplicity and flexibility contemplated by the rules." 
Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 
645 (3d Cir. 1989). Because, in cases alleging corporate 
fraud, "plaintiffs cannot be expected to have personal 
knowledge of the details of corporate internal affairs," we 
have relaxed the particularity rule "when factual 
information is peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge 
or control." Id. Nevertheless, "even under a non-restrictive 
application of the rule, pleaders must allege that the 
necessary information lies within defendants' control, and 
their allegations must be accompanied by a statement of 
the facts upon which the allegations are based." Id. 
 
In Craftmatic, we held that where a projection is alleged 
to have been issued "without a reasonable basis" and 
"knowingly and recklessly," a complaint must allege not 
only "the dates, the speaker, and the actual projections at 
issue" and that "there was no reasonable basis for the 
projections," but also "facts indicating why the charges 
against defendants are not baseless and why additional 
information lies exclusively within defendants' control." Id. 
at 646. In Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d 
Cir. 1992), we refined the Craftmatic standard, holding that 
"a boilerplate allegation that plaintiffs believe the necessary 
information `lies in defendants' exclusive control,' " if made, 
must be accompanied by "a statement of facts upon which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Defendants are free to make such an argument despite the absence of 
a cross-appeal. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397 n.16 (1979) 
("Appellees, as the prevailing parties, may of course assert any ground in 
support of that judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon 
or even considered by the trial court"); New Castle County v. Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1205 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A 
cross-appeal is unnecessary when an appellee endeavors to affirm a 
judgment in its favor by proffering an alternative theory in support of 
the 
district court's decision"). 
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their allegation is based." Id. at 285 (citing James W. Moore 
and Jo D. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice P 9.03[1] at 9-29 
(1991) ("where the facts are in the exclusive possession of 
the adversary, courts should permit the pleader to allege 
the facts on information and belief, provided a statement of 
the facts upon which the belief is founded is proffered")). 
Specifically, we required that "[t]o avoid dismissal in these 
circumstances, a complaint must delineate at least the 
nature and scope of plaintiffs' effort to obtain, before filing 
the complaint, the information needed to plead with 
particularity." Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 285. We directed that 
"plaintiffs thoroughly investigate all possible sources of 
information, including but not limited to all publicly 
available relevant information, before filing a complaint." Id. 
 
The complaint in the case before us directly addresses 
these standards. Paragraph 43, for example, restates the 
Shapiro standard word-for-word, then goes on to list the 
sources of information which plaintiffs have reviewed. App. 
at 36. The proffered list of "publicly available information" 
is expansive, including filings with the SEC, annual reports, 
press releases, recorded interviews, media reports on the 
company, and reports of securities analysts and investor 
advisory services.10 Further, plaintiffs -- presumably 
cognizant that their efforts were required to be "not limited 
to" publicly available information -- "consulted with and 
obtained the advice of an expert in financial analysis in 
connection with the meaning and method of calculation of 
[Quaker's] leverage ratios and the implications of 
defendants' decision to change [Quaker's] leverage ratio." 
App. at 37. Finally, the complaint makes the requisite 
assertion that "the underlying information relating to 
defendants' misconduct and the particulars thereof are not 
available to plaintiffs and the public and lie exclusively 
within the possession and control of defendants." 
Complaint at P 44. 
 
The complaint therefore meets the requirements of Rule 
9(b). Accordingly, we hold that Rule 9(b) does not offer a 
viable alternative ground for dismissal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. It is not clear whether these last reports were "publicly available." 
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B. The Earnings Growth Projections 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we have concluded that 
plaintiffs' claim based on defendants' statements about the 
total debt-to-total capitalization guideline ratio should not 
have been dismissed. We do not, however, think that 
plaintiffs' claim based on defendants' projections of 
earnings growth merits resuscitation. The district court 
correctly held that, in the particular circumstances of this 
case, these projections were immaterial.11  
 
Smithburg's statement at the August 4, 1994 "public 
meeting" that Quaker was "confident of achieving at least 
7% real earnings growth" in fiscal 1995, Complaint at P 27, 
might -- if left unmodified until the announcement of the 
merger -- have supported an action under 10b-5. 12 
Statements of "soft information" from high-ranking 
corporate officials can be actionable if they are made 
without a reasonable basis. See Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 283. 
And Smithburg's was not a vague expression of optimism 
like those that we have in the past held to be immaterial. 
See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 
114 F.3d 1410, 1432 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding vague and 
therefore immaterial "a general, non-specific statement of 
optimism or hope that a trend will continue"); Shapiro, 964 
F.2d at 283 n.12 (holding "United Jersey looks to the future 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We are not, however, persuaded by the district court's view that the 
earnings projections were per se reasonable because they were in accord 
with the company's performance over the previousfive years. 928 F. 
Supp. at 1386. A per se rule immunizing Quaker from the need to speak 
truthfully about the future merely because the company had performed 
well in the past seems to us improvident. It is not difficult to imagine 
situations in which the management of a company is well aware of 
circumstances, not previously present, which are very likely to have a 
grievous (or, for that matter, salutary) impact on future earnings; in 
such circumstances, a mere repetition of earnings figures for previous 
years might indeed give rise to liability. 
 
12. On the other hand, the effect of the merger on earnings growth, 
whatever it might have been, was almost certainly less direct and 
immediate than the effect of the merger on the total debt-total 
capitalization ratio. An increase in debt level is concrete and, in these 
circumstances, easy to foresee. A decrease in earnings growth seems to 
us a less readily foreseeable outcome of an acquisition. 
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with great optimism" to be "inactionable puffing"). Instead, 
it was a specific figure regarding a particular, defined time 
period -- namely, fiscal 1995. 
 
Furthermore, the statement contained no explicit 
cautionary language. The "bespeaks caution" doctrine, 
adopted by this court in In re Trump Casino Securities 
Litigation, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1178 (1994), provides that when "forecasts, opinions or 
projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements, the forward-looking statements will not form 
the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements 
did not affect the `total mix' of information . .. provided 
investors. In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, 
renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations 
immaterial as a matter of law." Id. at 371. Smithburg's 
statement was accompanied by no such language.13 
 
However, for the statement to have had deleterious effect, 
it would have had to remain "alive" in the market, 
unmodified, until the merger was announced. See 
Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1432. Plaintiffs allege that the harm 
caused by defendants' conduct -- a reduction in the value 
of plaintiffs' shares -- occurred only after the November 2 
announcement of the Snapple acquisition. If defendants 
made a public statement tending to cure any misleading 
effects of Smithburg's statement between August 4, the 
date of the news conference, and November 2, then 
Smithburg's statement would essentially be neutralized, 
and thereby made immaterial. 
 
Quaker's 1994 Annual Report -- issued on September 
23, 1994, more than five weeks prior to the November 2 
merger announcement -- contained the statement that "we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We note, as did the district court, that at the same meeting at which 
Smithburg stated that Quaker was " `confident' of achieving at least 7% 
real earnings growth," he also acknowledged that the company had 
"missed its 7% target" for fiscal 1994. But we do not believe that this 
latter statement constituted meaningfully cautionary language. Indeed, it 
seems to us just as likely that the fact that Smithburg expressed 
"confidence" in his projected figure while openly acknowledging a missed 
target the previous year would inspire greater belief in his current 
prediction. 
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are committed to achieving a real earnings growth of at 
least 7 percent over time." Complaint at P 33 (emphasis 
added). We conclude that the phrase "over time" in this 
second statement inoculates Quaker from any claims of 
fraud that point to a decline in earnings growth in the 
immediate aftermath of the Snapple acquisition. No 
reasonably careful investor would find material a prediction 
of seven-percent growth followed by the qualifier "over 
time." Therefore, we hold that no reasonablefinder of fact 
could conclude that the projection influenced prudent 
investors. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the projections of earnings 
growth cannot form a basis for an action under S 10(b), 
S 20(a), and Rule 10b-5 because any misleading effect the 
August 4 statement might have had was cured by the 
qualifier "over time" that appeared in the 1994 Annual 
Report. Given our decision with regard to the total debt-to- 
total capitalization ratio guideline, this holding does not 
prevent plaintiffs' suit from going forward. It may, however, 
limit the "class period" -- should the district court, on 
remand, decide to certify a class -- to the period between 
September 23, 1994, the date of the first potentially 
misleading restatement of the guideline -- and November 2, 
1994, the date of the merger announcement. 
 
Therefore, we will affirm the dismissal of the earnings- 
growth claim, albeit for reasons different from those given 
by the district court. 
 III. Conclusion 
 
The order of the district court dismissing plaintiffs' 
complaint for failure to state a claim is reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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